Dr. Mabuse and Mr. Edison
Jonathan Crary

In a 1988 interview with Serge Daney, Jean-Luc Godard surveys the life span of cinema. For him it is essentially “a nineteenth-century concern resolved in the twentieth.”¹ He locates its last flowerings in Italian neorealism, the Nouvelle Vague, and, finally, in the work of Rainer Werner Fassbinder. With the ubiquity of television, it was no longer a question of how one looked at the world, for television “quickly replaced the world and didn’t look at it anymore.”² Godard is, of course, only one of many in the last decade or two who have insisted that, even though films obviously continue to be made, their effects, their significance, the way they are consumed and produced now occurs amid such qualitatively different conditions that they bear only a depleted formal similarity to film in the first half of the twentieth century. Whether or not one agrees with Godard’s historicization here, or with related arguments by others, one of the assumptions of his polemic is the instability and transience of cinema as a cultural form within modernity.

In spite of such reminders we nonetheless have a tendency, even a need, to articulate certain visual practices in terms of enduring formal structures or innate characteristics. Many analyses of film, television, and photography make these phenomena into essentialized objects of analysis. There is also a persistent, and most often unexamined, Kantian prejudice that perceptual and cognitive capacities are ahistorical; that is, they are unchanging and permanent, and most significantly are independent of an external social/technological milieu that is in constant flux. Thus there are difficult historical problems in any attempt to posit anything more than a temporary subjective identity for a cinematic spectator, a television spectator and so on.

One has only to think of the influential meditations written in the 1970s on the philosophical and semiotic status of the photograph, which seemed so persuasive then, and of how they have been rendered quaintly obsolete by the spread of various digital techniques for image production.
The mimetic dimension of photography (actually challenged from the 1840s on) will perhaps one day seem like a peculiar digression within a larger trajectory of image making in the West. Television, partly because of the immediate physical presence of the TV set, seemed for several decades like a stable object when in fact the institutional relations of which it was a part were changing continuously during that time. But during the past ten years even the possibility of giving television a coherent identity has evaporated as monitors and screens of many kinds proliferate and intersect with a broad range of expanding flows and electronic networks.

Of course critical analyses of practices such as film, video or photography may at times need to work with synchronic assumptions or to pose provisional stable models for explanatory purposes, but a falsification occurs if such practices are treated as autonomous formal structures or independent visual media. They must also be thought of in terms of their inseparability from the intrinsic instability of larger processes of modernization.

More specifically, since the late nineteenth century, and increasingly during the last two decades, one crucial dimension of capitalist modernity has been a constant remaking of the conditions of sensory experience, in what could be called a revolutionizing of the means of perception. For the last hundred years perceptual modalities have been, and continue to be, in a state of perpetual transformation or, some might claim, of crisis. If vision can be said to have any enduring characteristic within twentieth-century modernity, it is that it has no enduring features. Rather, it is embedded in a rhythm of adaptability to new technological relations, social configurations, and economic imperatives. What we familiarly refer to as film, photography, and television are transient elements within an accelerating sequence of displacements and obsolescences, within the delirious logic of modernization. And by modernization I mean a process that is fully distinct from a notion of progress but which is instead a self-perpetuating, directionless creation of new needs and desires, new production, new consumption.

To step back for a moment to the late nineteenth century, it is worth
noting that it is just when the dynamic logic of capital begins to systematically undermine any stable or enduring structure of perception that capital simultaneously attempts to impose a disciplinary regime of attentiveness. The late nineteenth century is also when the human sciences, particularly the emerging field of scientific psychology, suddenly make central the question of attention. Attention was a problem whose importance related directly to the emergence of a social, urban, psychic, industrial field increasingly saturated with sensory input. Inattention, especially within the context of new forms of industrialized production and consumerism, begins to be seen as a threat and as a serious problem. It's possible to see one crucial aspect of modernity as a continual crisis of attentiveness: a crisis in which the changing configurations of capitalism push distraction to new limits and thresholds, with unending introduction of new organizations of sensory experience, new sources of stimulation and streams of information, and then respond with new methods of regulating but also productively harnessing perception.

By the late nineteenth century, capitalism in the West begins to spawn arrangements that require attentiveness of a subject in terms of a wide range of new spectacular tasks, but at the same time its internal movement was continually to dissolve the binding cognitive synthesis that was the basis of a disciplinary attentiveness. Part of the cultural logic of capitalism demands that we accept as natural switching our attention rapidly from one thing to another. Capital as high speed exchange and circulation is inseparable from this kind of human perceptual adaptability, and it imposes a regime of reciprocal attentiveness and distraction. The last decade has been a mere taste of the rapidity with which new forms of visual consumption will continue to supplant one another. Whether there are inherent social or psychic or even physiological limits to this acceleration remains to be seen.

One of the places where this particularly "modern" system of perceptual mutation can first be located is in the work of Thomas Edison. Edison stands not simply as a participant in the making of cinema but for a specific swerve that separates earlier nineteenth-century techniques of display, exhibition, and attention from what would follow in the twentieth.
What needs to be identified is not some sequence of optical devices running from the magic lantern, diorama, phenakistiscope, cinemascope, or 3-D movies to contemporary, head-mounted displays, but the emergence, beginning in the 1870s, of a new system of quantification and distribution. For Edison, cinema had no significance in itself—it was simply one of a potentially endless stream of ways in which a space of consumption and circulation could be dynamized, activated. Edison saw the marketplace in terms of how images, sounds, energy, or information could be reshaped into measurable and distributable commodities, and how a social field of individual subjects could be arranged into increasingly separate and specialized units of consumption. Now, the logic that supported the Kinetoscope and the phonograph—that is, the structuring of perceptual experience in terms of a solitary rather than a collective subject—is replayed in the increasing centrality of the VDT screen as the primary vehicle for the distribution and consumption of electronic entertainment commodities.

At the same time, Edison was one of the first to intuit the economic interrelation between hardware and software (i.e., the machines to make movies, the machines with which to view movies, and the movies themselves), establishing as he did enduring patterns of vertical integration of these spheres of production within a single corporation. Edison’s first technological product, a hybrid teletype machine-stock ticker of the early 1870s, is paradigmatic for what it foreshadows in subsequent technological setups—the indistinction between information and visual images, and quantifiable flow as the object of consumption. Edison’s understanding of some of the key systemic features of capitalism underscores the abstract nature of the products he “invented”; his work was about the continual manufacture of new needs and the consequent restructuring of the network of relations in which such products would be consumed. Steven Jobs, Bill Gates, et al. are simply later participants in this same historical project of perpetual rationalization and modernization. In the late twentieth century, as in the late nineteenth century, the management of attention depends on the capacity of an observer to adjust to continual repatternings of the ways in which a sensory world can be consumed.
Critics such as Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin brought the notion of “distraction” to the forefront of debates about the effects of cinema in twentieth-century mass culture. In a general way, their work, and much that followed, articulates distraction as a term opposed to the idea of a contemplative perception, a self-conscious apperception. Movies, as products of an incipient culture industry, seemed to signal the transformation of perception into a debased form of mere external stimulation, very different from an older, more sustained, self-aware modality of looking. In the context of music, a related distinction was made by others between “higher” (deeply attentive) and “lower” (distracted) forms of listening. In both cases works of high modernism were cited as examples in which some kind of purified, even ethically superior, perceptual engagement was possible.

But some of those in the nineteenth century who most deplored the “distracted” qualities of an emerging mass culture sought to push their own art in the direction of a kind of attentiveness remarkably close to what popular cinema would claim in the twentieth century, especially after 1930. For example, Richard Wagner’s frustrations with the experience of music drama, of theater, in the mid-nineteenth century were in part about the general problem of inattentiveness — of spectators who were given multiple points of attraction, of theaters constructed so that audiences delighted in looking at themselves, at the orchestra, at the diverse social texture around them (which was the case with the variety show formats of early cinema as well).

One aspect of Wagner’s “reforms,” incarnated in the design of Bayreuth, involved the transformation of the nineteenth-century theater into a protocinematic space. Bayreuth diagrammed a new kind of viewing machine which more rigorously controlled the spectator’s perceptual experience. It not only integrated the sightlines of the audience with the orthogonals of scenic space (eliminating the lateral views of older theater design), but also initiated the idea of near complete darkness as a way of heightening the intensity of lighting effects on stage. Wagner’s insistence on lowering the orchestra out of sight is another part of the thoroughly “phantasmagoric” character of his work discussed by Theodor
Adorno and others. As many have noted, there was a sizable gap between Wagner’s ambitions and the technical resources that were available to him in his lifetime. He never fully reconciled himself to having to work with the clunkiness of mundane stagecraft, with greasepaint on the singer’s faces and with how these interfered with the full absorption of an audience into his work. Wagner, despite the archaizing surfaces, stands for a new will to mastery over all aspects of spectacle that would allow for the calculated production of states of regression, fascination, dream — the very kind of attentiveness that would fully belong to cinema half a century later. Nonetheless, his control over emotional response was potent enough to provoke Nietzsche’s insistence that Wagner furnished “the first example, only too insidious, only too successful, of hypnotism by means of music . . . persuasion by the nerves.”

The institutional and technological shifts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, briefly suggested here, were bound up in new knowledge about perception, cognition, and the subjective experience of vision. For several hundred years up into the nineteenth century, a wide range of ideas about vision had tended to emphasize those features of perception that were stable, predictable and supported the notion of a manifest correspondence between the world and what the eye saw. Vision itself may not have changed in the nineteenth century but what did change dramatically was the development of knowledge and theories that foreground very different features of vision: the unreliability, the internal volatility, and the uncertain temporality of visual perception.

This volatility is evident in many places, for example in the late work of Cézanne. Not only does Cézanne disclose the distractions that are inherent in even the most rapt form of attention, but he heralds the dynamization of perception occurring in many different domains by the late 1890s, including those in which someone like Edison was involved. What Cézanne powerfully describes is not a logic of contemplative distance, or of perceptual autonomy, but rather an account of a nervous system interfacing with a mobile, continually transforming external environment. Contemporary with early cinema, Cézanne’s work in the 1890s involves a sweeping destabilization of what previously had
constituted an “image.” His work is one of numerous contemporary expressions of the notion that reality can be conceptualized as a dynamic aggregate of sensations. For Cézanne and for the emerging industries of the spectacle, a stable punctual model of perception is no longer effective or useful.

Obviously Cézanne’s images are static but, like those of Jules-Etienne Marey, they document perceptual experience that is in constant flux and are about the recording of temporal processes, motor responses and rhythms. Part of Cézanne’s singularity was the relentlessness with which he was alert to his own perceptual experience. Perhaps as much as any one artist, Cézanne disclosed the paradoxes and the malleability of attentiveness — that looking at any one thing intently, rather than leading to a fuller and fuller grasp of its very presence, its rich immediacy, finally leads to its perceptual disintegration and loss, its breakdown as intelligible form. That is, attention and distraction are not distinct but part of a dynamic continuum in which attention was always of limited duration, inevitably disintegrating into a distracted state. For Cézanne, this dissolution inherent in attentiveness not only allowed his radical desymbolization of the world but also produced an interface with a perpetually modulating set of relations between what had been thought of as “external” events and sensations. Paradoxically, it was through his own immersion in the physiological features of vision (for example the distinction between the foveal and peripheral areas of the retina and the disjunct, non-homogenous visual field that results from that) that he aspired to exceed the corporeal limits of vision in quest of a new mode of inhabiting the material world. Cézanne’s late work poses the exhilarating outlines of a new kind of eye that would overcome the monadic nature of embodied human vision and be able to see with an impossible kind of attentiveness, an eye without constraints, cut loose from its physical anchorage.

For example, one key feature of Cézanne’s landscapes from the late 1890s is the eradication of any consistent distinction between near and far vision, between what has often been referred to as haptic and optic perception. There is no longer any spatial schema in Cézanne’s work
which allows those distinctions to retain their coherence; instead, his surfaces are assembled unpredictably out of the enigmatic palpability of distant forms and the evanescence of seemingly near-at-hand objects. This oscillation between close and distant vision, or between focus and out of focus, parallels montage effects in film which bind dramatically different spatial positions into new kinds of syntheses and adjacencies. For all their differences, Cézanne’s work and cinema both posed the possibility of what Gilles Deleuze has described as an acentered ensemble of variable elements which act and react on each other. They are products of a moment at the end of the nineteenth century when, according to Deleuze, it was no longer possible to hold or occupy an unambiguous position and when more and more movement was entering psychic life.

It has long been said of Cézanne that he never acquired the trucs or gimmicks of the atelier, that he was relatively free of readymade schema and traditional solutions for pictorial organization (including, for example, much of the historically accumulated practices associated with linear perspective). But if these accounts of Cézanne as a kind of primitive who avoided any premade interpretations of the world are useful, it is because they suggest Cézanne’s particular sensitivity to and observation of perceptual experiences that had been ignored, or marginalized, or that had been incompatible (and hence unarticulated) within older (classical) organizations of knowledge about vision. Cézanne’s work, then, is less about a tabula rasa than about repeated and varied attempts to achieve a “presuppositionless” engagement with the visible world, to achieve a liquid, groundless space, filled with forces, events, and intensities rather than objects. But it was just such a malleable and tractable visual space that would become subject to endless forms of external restructuring, manipulation, and colonization throughout the twentieth century.

Within modernity the terrain and tools of invention, freedom, and creation are always intertwined with those of domination and control.

*   *   *   *
One of the most extraordinary articulations of the connection between attentiveness and the changing field of institutional and technological modernity can be found in the work of Fritz Lang. The critic Raymond Bellour has written about Lang that there is no other filmmaker for whom vision is so nakedly and so unequivocally the ultimate metaphor: not Sternberg, not Eisenstein, not Hitchcock. I would add that what is crucial about Lang's thought on vision is its relation to shifting and historically determined mechanisms of power.

I want to discuss briefly Lang's great trilogy that spans most of his career, his three Mabuse films: the two-part Dr. Mabuse the Gambler of 1921–22, The Last Testament of Dr. Mabuse of 1932–33, and The Thousand Eyes of Dr. Mabuse of 1960. These films compellingly chart the mobile characteristics of various perceptual technologies and apparatuses of power, culminating in a precocious meditation in the final film on the status of the video screen. What becomes clear is how the name "Mabuse" does not finally designate a fictional character that Lang returned to several times (let alone a character that fits Kracauer's "Caligari to Hitler" hypothesis). Rather Mabuse is the name of a system—a system of spectacular power whose strategies are continually changing but whose aim of producing "docile" subjects remains relatively constant. On a more biographical level, the three films together also stand for Lang's own turbulent itinerary from work in the German theater and silent film industry in the teens through the era of the big German studios in the early thirties to two decades in the heart of what two of his fellow German neighbors in 1944 Los Angeles, Horkheimer and Adorno, called "the culture industry" and to his final meditations on the hegemony of television.

In the first of these films, Dr. Mabuse the Gambler, Lang sketches out a panoply of modern practices of control, persuasion, and coercion. In this silent film Mabuse stands for an array of spectacular techniques of dazzlement, immobilization, and suggestion; that is to say for powerful effects generally describable as
hypnotic. But unlike Freud, whose essay on “Group Psychology” dates from the same year as this film (1921), Lang is less interested in the nature of an emotional tie to a charismatic figure than he is in a diverse technology of influence. The protean Mabuse, in his multiple masks and guises, becomes a principle of flexible and versatile power rather than a figuration of totalitarianism. In Dr. Mabuse the Gambler control is exerted within the perceptual fields of cultural and economic space—including the rhythmic attractions of the roulette wheel and the shifting quotes on the wall of the stock exchange.

But by the early 1930s, in The Last Testament of Dr. Mabuse, Lang identifies a different arrangement of power effects. It is in this period that a modern perceptual regime of reciprocal attentiveness and distraction takes on some of its paradigmatic modern features. If one follows Guy Debord’s own historicization of spectacular culture, it is possible to suggest that it is around 1930 when it becomes structurally implanted in the West—the institutional and technological origins of television, the consolidation of corporate control over both television and radio, the emergence of urbanism as a regime of social control, and the introduction of synchronized sound into films and the first concerted use of sound/image technology by state power in Nazi propaganda. These are just some of the components of the social environment in which Lang was operating and in which Walter Benjamin would soon make a diagnosis of a “crisis in the nature of perception itself.” Later in that decade Benjamin presented his interrelated images of the disjunctions of the gambling table, the tempo of the industrial assembly line, and the reel of film; for Benjamin these were equally emblems of the deterioration of experience—experience as an indifferent sequence of stimuli without order. This organization of experience for him was above all the obliteration of a Kantian model of apperception and its replacement by the perceptual fragment or ruin.

In the extraordinary first five minutes of Lang’s 1932 film, which opens in an urban industrial zone, we hear nothing but the deafening and finally numbing noise of the monotonous functioning of heavy factory machinery (a kind of British Sounds almost forty years before Jean-Luc
Established from the start is a milieu fully defamiliarized by processes of modernization in which an older model of sensory integration is deranged and fragmented (precisely the opposite of the institutional claims for the sound film). It is in these circumstances that Lang delineates how arrangements of power around forms of ocular domination give way to tactics of simulation, recording, and tele-communication in which auditory experience is primary. In other words, the Mabuse system cannot be reduced to a visual model, for it deploys a broader range of perceptual management. Sound had of course been part of cinema in various additive forms from the beginning, but clearly the introduction of synchronized sound decisively transformed the nature of attention within a spectacular setup. At the same time, this film does away with the figure of Dr. Mabuse completely, further diffusing and delocalizing the operation of power from some center of control and intentionality. One of the key elements in this film is the procedure by which members of the underworld network receive their orders: they are contacted by a voice emanating from a hidden loudspeaker and recording devices. Like the optical modalities in the earlier film, hypnotic forms of influence here proceed by the isolation of a single sense, in this case hearing rather than vision.

Finally, The Thousand Eyes of Dr. Mabuse is significant for the way the cathode ray tube becomes a dominant component of the Mabuse system. Lang hardly presents a homogenous image of television here, specifically differentiating broadcast TV on one hand and the use of closed circuit video for surveillance on the other. The panopticism of the film’s title is not inappropriate in that part of the film’s formal structure is built around a network of surveillance cameras feeding video images back to a massive bank of monitors. Rather than suggesting Orwellian models of ubiquitous control, Lang situates the television screens within a larger and chaotic spectacular regime of pseudo-events, disinformation, voyeurism, and scopic desire. The cathode ray tube becomes a means for Lang to explore the relation between new abstract perceptual spaces that exceed his own accumulated experience of the cultural conditions of cinema. One of the work’s most piercing moments is a slow,
seamless dissolve from a filmed image of a scene to a video screen of the same image. Lang’s particular overlapping of these two kinds of screens is an announcement of a specific historical passage to a new arena of techniques of subjectification, when cinema is supplanted or infiltrated in various ways by television.

It should be noted that the technological themes developed in the Mabuse films are also evident in other Lang works—even from the early 1920s Lang was a close observer of the ways in which different technological networks permeated a densely layered social space, whether in *Spies* (1928), *M* (1931), *Metropolis* (1927) or *Fury* (1936). Well before the advent of television Lang was finely attuned to the enigmatic character of a seemingly mundane object such as a typewriter or telephone and how its habitual use incorporated its user within the operations of institutional power.

By the mid-1950s Lang was describing a bleaker landscape. In *While the City Sleeps* (1956) he returns to the theme of *M*, the serial killer, but instead of examining a social space through diverse investigative and juridical practices, the actuality of the murderer and his crimes is fully subsumed within a media-saturated regime of information. The transgressive nature of the Peter Lorre figure in *M*, which mobilized all sectors of society in order to rid itself of the offending presence, gives way here to a world in which a murderer is transformed into a commodity for spectacular consumption. And the film details the corrosive and fatal effects of a world constituted solely as commodifiable spectacle, in this case as newspaper, photograph, and television.

Part of what Lang designated by the name Mabuse was a system that produced and depended on subjects who were “open to influence” or, in Foucault’s words, who were reduced as a political force. A work that deliriously explored more recent configurations of the “Mabuse” system was David Cronenberg’s 1982 film *Videodrome*. Cronenberg addresses the addictive and hypnotic effects of electronic media and provides a remarkable description of the ways in which large zones of perceptual experience are being reshaped by an ongoing biotechnic modernization within which the nervous system has less and less of an autonomous
identity. Obviously much attention has been paid to Cronenberg’s visceral metaphors for various conjunctions of body and machine, and clearly these exorbitant images of the body’s sheer openness are about a maximum condition of interface, about an interpenetration of the subject so thorough that the notion of “interiority” ceases to be relevant. As part of that specifically Canadian discourse on technology, Cronenberg pushes Marshall McLuhan’s famous notion of the “outering” of the senses to a terminal extreme. It is also a vision of Edison’s rudimentary system, operating at a more perfected level, in which the brain and body are essentially hardware accessible to any powerful external software. Videodrome’s now famous line, “The television screen is the retina of the mind’s eye,” announces a final break with the last vestiges of a Cartesian tradition of mental images and the eradication of what was once thought of as the imagination. In this sense the film is also an auto-reflection on the very transience of cinema as an artifact within the mediated spaces Cronenberg maps out for us. If hypnosis and addiction are central in the film, Cronenberg, like Lang, hardly presents them in terms of a totalized and seamless operation of institutional power. The Videodrome system is out of anyone’s control, always on the edge of short-circuiting its own effectiveness.

The psychotic disorder of Videodrome is part of the crisis of continual subjective adaptation to a mutating technological environment. What is especially important about Videodrome is its detailing of the patchwork nature of contemporary subjective experience: a mix of new and old perceptual modalities, of hybrid zones composed of residual Euclidian space and dimensionless experiences of video hallucination that appear to be seamlessly connected. It is a question of a densely sedimented experiential world whose substantiality is continually undermined by synthetic realities involving the accelerated formation of short-lived microworlds and their equally abrupt breakdown — but this is not unrelated to what Benjamin, Georg Simmel and others had begun, in relation to a very different set of objects, to describe as shock earlier in this century.

One example of this patchwork texture is the remarkable moment in the film when the protagonist, now psychically and physically sub-
jugated by electronic images, crosses a city street. As he does so, he encounters two men carrying a large framed window, the glass divided into four panes. For an instant the center of this horizontal window overlaps with a centralized, axial view of the street and coincides with the vanishing point of classical one point perspective. It is, along with a sardonic reference to Leonardo da Vinci, a brief reminder of the nominal survival but increasing irrelevance of that Renaissance schema for representing the world in terms of a pyramidal cone of vision and a point to point relation between subject and object. Videodrome is fundamentally about the annihilation of the last remains of a model of vision which involved distance and a seeing through, like the delimited sectional view through a window or even through the viewfinder of a mobile movie camera.⁸

Cronenberg’s film provides one particular diagram of the territory which cinema had previously occupied, alluded to in Godard’s remarks cited above. Of course Godard’s notion of the end of cinema must also be read through his own move to video, television and mixed technical practices, which began in the mid-1970s. It should be remembered too that in 1973 Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow located cinema as one specific and finite episode within a much broader twentieth-century history of techniques of control, conditioning, and abstract simulation. The 1970s can be historicized as a transitional period in many ways, but in this context they are important as the time when the status of film and photography as analog media began to shift, slowly at first, into digital modes.

Now well into the 1990s, enveloped by homogenous entertainment products (whether they are seen in a large theater or on a small computer monitor, whether they are called music videos, CD-ROM games, movies, virtual reality displays, or TV advertisements), we have an expanded sense of the consequences and possibilities of that technological realignment begun in the 1970s. From certain critical vantage points this shift has the status of a major cultural rupture, a rift in the real, the inauguration of an age of simulation, a remaking of subjectivity, and so on. But as I have tried to suggest here, whatever age we feel we may
have passed into it will, much sooner than we suspect, be reconfigured by the appearance of another set of technological promises and products, obsolescences and derelict spaces, new forms of verisimilitude, reorganizations of social time, of distribution and consumption, into another seemingly unprecedented epoch. One of the most persistent features of modernity is the potent seductiveness of the phantasmagoria of progress, and among the ranks of the seduced are those who believe that modernity has somehow been exceeded. But if global capitalism continues to consolidate itself we will simply always be in the same historical era in relation to the enduring and mundane imperatives of capitalist modernization and rationalization.
2 Ibid., 164.
3 The work of Tom Gunning has been particularly important in reconsidering the question of distraction in early cinema. See, for example, his "The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator, and the Avant-Garde," in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, Thomas Elsaesser, ed. (London: British Film Institute, 1990), 56–62.
4 See, for example, Beat Wyss, "Ragnarök of Illusion: Richard Wagner's 'Mystical Abyss' at Bayreuth," October 54 (Fall 1990), 57–58.
8 It should be noted that Cronenberg presents a differentiated global arrangement in which the ideological model for control of the Third World is still that of eyeglasses, produced by the multinational conglomerate, Spectacular Optical.